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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellant Dana Smith filed a pro se motion for a new trial asserting that he should have 
but did not have a competency evaluation or competency hearing and that he was not competent 
during the trial proceedings. CR 6-7. The district court found the motion to be untimely, 
declined to appoint counsel and denied the motion. CR 49-50. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
I. Prior proceedings 
Mr. Smith was convicted of grand theft and his conviction and sentence were affirmed by 
the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion on May 20, 2009. State v. Smith. No. 35216. 1 
Mr. Smith then filed a petition for post-conviction relief prior to the completion of the direct 
appeal. Id. Relief was denied and an appeal taken. Smith v. State, No. 40418. However, 
appellate relief was denied by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion on November 14, 
2011. Id. 
On January 19, 2012, Mr. Smith filed a motion for new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence. CR 1. Smith's motion was based on his assertion that he was mentally 
incompetent when he was tried for grand theft and that the district court had erred in failing to 
sua sponte order a competency evaluation under I.C. § 18-211. 
2. Factual background/or new trial motion 
Mr. Smith was correct in his assertion that there was never a competency hearing, but was 
1 The Court has taken judicial notice of the files and records in State v. Dana Smith, No. 
39704 (the motion for new trial appeal) and State v. Dana Smith, No. 35216 (the appeal from the 
judgment and sentence). 
mistaken in his assertion that he did not have a competency evaluation. The record from No. 
35216 shows that Judge John Melanson ordered an LC.§ 18-211 competency evaluation. T (No. 
35216) (April 10, 2007), pg. 52, In. 1-9. Richard V. Smith, Ph.D. did the evaluation and wrote: 
His ability to assist in his own defense presents a question, however. He can and 
does ramble off rather inappropriately, both in terms of content and style 
intermittently. In my view that likely seriously impairs his ability to work 
systematically with his attorney in a sustained fashion. That is, there are brief 
periods in which he appears to be very lucid and very much on target. However, 
as indicated, intermittently he gets off target, is fairly irrational, bizarre, and 
grandiose. In those regards, [i]t is my opinion that he cannot effectively and 
systematically work with his defense attorney in a sustained fashion. 
Smith Report, pg. 8 (in PSI). Dr. Smith went on to say: 
In my opinion this examinee does not need to be rehospitalized. He can in all 
likelihood be treated safely on an outpatient basis and should resume medications 
to stabilize his mood. That being the case, once those medications would become 
effective then he could in all likelihood proceed with the matters in court that he is 
currently facing. 
Id. Thus, Dr. Smith did not think Mr. Smith was competent to stand trial because he could not 
assist his attorney in a rational manner, but that he could be competent to do so once he was 
stabilized on his medications. 
Dr. Smith's report was dated on May 2, 2007. On June 4, 2007, Mr. Smith's attorney, 
Dennis Byington, told the Court, when Mr. Smith was not present, that Mr. Smith "had been 
found to be not competent in aiding in his own defense to a certain degree." T (No. 35216) (June 
4, 2007) pg. 69, ln. 12 - pg. 70, In. 7. He went on to tell the Court that Mr. Smith was on the 
"medication that they have prescribed" and asked that a trial date be set. Id. Thus, Mr. Smith is 
correct that he never had a competency hearing, nor was Mr. Smith's fitness to proceed 
"determined by the court," as required by LC. § 18-212(1 ). 
2 
Prior to the criminal trial, Mr. Smith told the court that Mr. Byington "wants me to get on 
medication and take - to take medication, because he feels maybe I'm aggressive or mad." T 
(No. 35316) (October 15, 2007) pg. 88, In. 23-25. Mr. Smith also told the court that he had been 
prescribed Celexa and Trazodone. Id, pg. 91, In. 24 - pg. 92, In. 2. On October 29, 2007, two 
days before the start of trial, defense counsel told that court that he "was advised last week that 
the jail had taken [Mr. Smith] off one of his medications," but "as of Friday, they would have -
they were going to put him back on the medication." He also told the court "we are prepared to 
go to trial, but he needs to be on his medication." Id., pg. 99, In. 5 - pg. 100, In. 10. During the 
trial, defense counsel said that it was his "understanding [was] that the jail has agreed to put him 
back on medications that was prescribed." T (No, 35316) (October 31, 2007). However, no 
psychologist or psychiatrist was ever asked to reexamine Mr. Smith to determine what effect, if 
any, the medication was having. So, even if Mr. Smith was taking the indicated medication, 
there is no evidence in the record that the medications had restored his competence at the time of 
trial. 
The district court did note during trial that it had not noticed anything inappropriate with 
Mr. Smith's interactions with his attorney. Id, pg. 349, In. 3-17. However, the court noted that it 
had observed Mr. Smith "very vigorously" participating in his defense, "frequently talking with 
counsel ... giving instructions to counsel [ and] passing notes to counsel. And again, lots of 
communication." Id, pg. 349, In. 3-17. Thus, none of the court's observations foreclose the 
possibility that Mr. Smith was not competent as the basis of his lack of competency was his 
tendency to get "off target," and act "fairly irrational, bizarre, and grandiose" as was noted by Dr. 
Smith. Competency Report, pg. 8 (in PSI). To the contrary, the type of intrusive communication 
3 
between client and attorney observed by the district court suggests Mr. Smith was manifesting 
the behavior which rendered him incompetent. 
3. The 2012 new trial motion 
In support of his January 19, 2012 motion for new trial, Mr. Smith provided a long 
statement of his history of serious and severe mental illness and incapacity. R No. #39704, pg. 
2-17. Noting that Mr. Smith had filed at least five prior motions for a new trial, the court denied 
the January 19 motion on the basis that it was untimely and the court lacked jurisdiction to hear 
it. R No. #39704, pg. 23-24. 
An appeal timely followed. R No. #39704, 26-29. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court on March 28, 2013, holding that the time 
to file a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence may not be filed beyond 
the two-year limitation. State v. Smith, 154 Idaho 581,300 P.3d 1069 (Ct. App. 2013). 
4. The current new trial motion 
While the appeal in No. #39709 was pending, Mr. Smith filed another prose motion for a 
new trial in the district court. CR 6. Mr. Smith again alleged that the district court had failed to 
sua sponte order a competency evaluation and "failed to ascertain whether or not the defendant 
was competent to proceed to trial." Id He also argued that "under § 18-210, Defendant[']s 
statutory time limit is tolled pending an evaluation to determine the Defendant's competency to 
stand trial." CR 6. 
In his memorandum of law filed with the motion, Mr. Smith argued that "the district 
court's allowance of the case to be proved while Defendant was still mentally ill violated 
statutes, laws and the Constitution of the state ofldaho." CR 8. Further, "the statute [I.C. § 18-
4 
21 O] requires that because the conviction was entered while Defendant was mentally incompetent 
that the time for final judgment be tolled pending a psychiatric examination." CR 9. "Since the 
defendant cannot be convicted while incompetence endures, [h]e/she shall be entitled to statutory 
tolling pending medical evidence to show that the defendant is competent to proceed." CR 16. 
Mr. Smith also alerted the district court to United States Supreme Court case law which 
held that the one year statute oflimitations for filing a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
may be equitably tolled. CR 16, citing Holland v. Florida, -U.S.-, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 
(2010) ("[W]e hold that [28 U.S.C. ]§ 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate 
cases.") In this argument, Mr. Smith says that Holland stands for the proposition that "a 
defendant is entitled to statutory tolling of the statute oflimitations," id, but it appears that he has 
confused statutory tolling of the time in which to file a pleading, i.e., a tolling provision which is 
found in statutory law, with equitable tolling, i.e., a tolling provision created by case law to 
provide relief under extraordinary circumstances. 
Along with the Motion for New Trial and the memorandum in support, Mr. Smith filed a 
Motion to Request the Court Take Judicial Notice of the record in the case. He also filed a 
Motion for Appointment of Counsel. Aug. CR.2 The court then issued an Order RE Motion for 
New Trial stating that "[i]t appears to this Court that the Court is without jurisdiction to hear any 
of these matters because a final judgment was entered more than two years ago," and noting that 
I.C.R. 34 does not permit a new trial motion to be made for any reason more than two years after 
final judgment. It then ordered the parties to file a brief concerning the sole issue of whether the 
2 On July 3, 2013, the Court granted Mr. Smith's Motion to Augment the Record. The 
file-stamped documents attached to that motion are cited herein as "Aug. CR." 
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court has jurisdiction to rule on Mr. Smith's motions. Aug. CR (Order, pg. 1-2). 
The court's order for briefing on the statute oflimitations issue was filed on March 27, 
2013, one day before this Court issued its opinion in No. 39704. State v. Smith, 154 Idaho 581, 
300 P.3d 1069 (Ct. App. March 28, 2013). In No. 39704, the Court found that Mr. Smith's new 
trial motion was untimely and rejected his argument that the language of LC. § 19-2407-that a 
motion must be filed within the time provided by the rules "unless the court or judge extends the 
time"-permits a court to extend the two-year period. The Court wrote, "[t]he section 19-2407 
contemplation of a possible extension of time by the court has no application in this case because 
the Idaho Criminal Rules do not permit a court to authorize such an extension." State v. Smith, 
154 Idaho at 582,300 P.3d at 1070. Most pertinent to this appeal, the Court of Appeals wrote in 
a footnote: "Notably, Smith does not contend that his motion for a new trial was based upon 
evidence that was not discovered until after the two-year period had expired, or that he was 
prevented from timely filing his motion by action of the State, or that the time limit of !.C.R. 34 
is unconstitutional in its application to his case." Id., n. 3. 3 
In the present case, perhaps taking the hint from the Court of Appeals's footnote, Mr. 
Smith argued, in response to the Court's order for briefing, that "I.C.R. 34 is unconstitutional and 
that the Idaho Statute 19-2406 does not provide a procedural mechanism for this particular case 
were [sic - where] the statute violates both LC. and Idaho Constitution." Aug. CR (Response to 
Court's Order, pg. 1 ). In particular, he argued that "the application of I.C.R. 34 is 
3 It is no surprise that these arguments were not made on appeal because they were not 
made below, see CR No. 39704, and the fundamental en-or doctrine does not apply to post-
conviction proceedings. Person v. State, 147 Idaho 453,455,210 P.3d 561,563 (Ct. App. 2009). 
So the point of the Court's footnote is unclear, unless it was to suggest that Mr. Smith take a new 
tack. 
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unconstitutional in its application in this case." Aug. CR (Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Response to Court Order, pg. 4). "The I.C.R. 34 has no procedural mechanism to address a 
clearly invalid conviction, which would address the nature of malfeasance of the court. It's 
[ c ]lear that the statute in this case is unconstitutional on the grounds of due process and the equal 
protections of the law." Aug. CR (Memo., pg. 10). (This was filed on April 9, 2013, less than 
two weeks after the issuance of the opinion in No. 39704.) 
The state's response to the court's briefing order was to merely note the Court of 
Appeals's opinion in No. 39704 and argue that "the decision from the Court of Appeals affirming 
this Court's prior denial of this defendant's motion for a new trial in this very case is on point, 
and the motion is untimely and should be denied." Aug. CR (State's Response, pg. 2). The state 
did not address Mr. Smith's new constitutional issues. 
The court did not discuss Mr. Smith's constitutional arguments either. Instead, it only 
stated that it "knows of no rule, statute, or case law that would give the Court jurisdiction to hear 
any of these matters and the parties have cited to none." CR 50. It continued: "Defendant's 
motion for new trial is frivolous and he is not entitled to the appointment of counsel." With that, 
the court denied all of Mr. Smith's motions. Id. 
A timely notice of appeal was filed. CR 52. 
III. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the court err in denying Mr. Smith's motion for appointment of counsel in light of the 
non-frivolous constitutional tolling argument made by him? 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Smith's Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel 
A needy person has the right to be represented by counsel in any post-commitment 
proceeding that the needy person considers appropriate, "unless the court in which the proceeding 
is brought determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means 
would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous proceeding." LC. § 
19-852(b)(3); see also State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 523-24, 873 P.2d 167, 168-69 (Ct. App. 
1994). According to the Supreme Court: 
When applying that standard to pro se applications for appointment of counsel, the 
trial court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se 
petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete. Although facts sufficient to 
state a claim may not be alleged because they do not exist, they also may not be 
alleged because the pro se petitioner simply does not know what are the essential 
elements of a claim. 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). The decision to appoint 
counsel in a post-judgment proceeding lies within the discretion of the district court. Thus, on 
appeal, the decision whether to appoint counsel is reviewed under the abuse of discretion 
standard. See Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,684, 978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Here, the district court found the proceeding was untimely and therefore frivolous. It 
abused its discretion in so concluding because it did not even consider Mr. Smith's constitutional 
argument which this Court in No. 39704 specifically noted was not before it. State v. Smith, 154 
Idaho at 582, n.3, 300 P.3d at 1070, n. 3. Had the district court considered the new constitutional 
issue, it would have appointed Mr. Smith counsel to present that argument and to support the 
argument with affidavits and supporting documents. 
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Mr. Smith argued that the application of the I.C.R. 34 time limit violated his due process 
and equal protection rights. He is correct. Access to courts has been called a "fundamental right." 
Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 191, 30 P.3d 967,969 (2001); see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 
817,827 (1977); and also Coleman v. State, 114 Idaho 901, 762 P.2d 814 (1988). While Article 
1, Section 18 of the Idaho Constitution states that "Courts of justice shall be open to every 
person," the right of access to the courts has been grounded in the Due Process Clauses of the 
Idaho and United States Constitutions. Id.; see Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530,535, 944 P.2d 
127, 132 (1997); see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11 n. 6 (1989). Due process affords 
prisoners "a limited right of access to the courts, to challenge their convictions or their 
confinement and to pursue actions for violations of their civil rights." State, Bureau of Child 
Support Services v. Garcia, 132 Idaho 505,510, 975 P.2d 793, 798 (Ct. App. 1999) citing 
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821. 
Inmate access to the courts must be "adequate, effective, and meaningful." Bounds, supra. 
To this end, indigent prisoners must be allowed to file appeals and habeas corpus petitions without 
payment of docket fees, Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257, (1959); states must provide trial records 
to inmates unable to buy them, Grifjin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956); and counsel must be 
appointed to give indigent inmates "a meaningful appeal" from their convictions. Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963). The right of access ensures that a pleading challenging the 
legitimacy of state custody will reach a court for its consideration. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 
at 191. 
Mental disease and/or psychotropic medication which prevented the petitioner from timely 
pursuing challenges to the conviction have been recognized as bases for equitable tolling in Idaho 
9 
in the post-conviction context. Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 385, 924 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 
1996). This is consistent with the general rule in the United States. See Brian R. Means, 
"Equitable tolling-Extraordinary circumstances-Mental and physical disabilities of the 
petitioner," Postconviction Remedies§ 25:45 (Database updated July 2013). In Abbott, "the 
applicant alleged that he was mentally incompetent during the criminal proceedings and that 
following his sentencing he was kept under the influence of psychotropic medication which kept 
him mentally incapacitated. His response to the State's motion to dismiss alleges that he was only 
recently taken off of these drugs." The Court noted that "[t]hese allegations were not disproved by 
the State." It concluded that: 
Abbott's assertion that mental disease or psychotropic medication rendered him 
incompetent and prevented him from earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction 
are sufficient to raise factual issues and intertwining legal issues as to whether he 
was prevented from timely filing his action by mental incapacity or medication, 
whether strict application of the one-year statute oflimitation would deprive Abbott 
of any meaningful opportunity to present his claims for post-conviction relief, and 
whether the statute of limitation should be deemed tolled in such circumstance to 
avoid violation of constitutional due process guarantees .... Because these factual 
and legal issues were not recognized or addressed in the proceedings below, we 
decline to affirm the determination that Abbott's claim is barred by the statute of 
limitation. 
Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho at 385, 924 P.2d at 1229 (internal citations omitted). 
The Court in Chico-Rodriguez v. State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 
2005), clarified Abbott: 
It is not enough to show that compliance was simply made more difficult on 
account of a mental condition. We hold that in order for the statute of limitation 
under the UPCPA to be tolled on account of a mental illness, an unrepresented 
petitioner must show that he suffered from a serious mental illness which rendered 
him incompetent to understand his legal right to bring an action within a year or 
otherwise rendered him incapable of taking necessary steps to pursue that right. 
10 
Id. 
Equitable tolling will apply only during the period in which the petitioner's mental 
illness actually prevented him from filing a post-conviction action; any period 
following conviction during which the petitioner fails to meet the equitable tolling 
criteria will count toward the limitation period. 
Thus, if Mr. Smith could demonstrate that his mental illness prevented him from timely 
filing his claim, he could show the strict application of the Rule 34 time limits were violative of 
due process. This is not a frivolous claim. However, it was not considered when the court denied 
the motion for appointment of counsel. This was an abuse of discretion under the Sun Valley 
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991), test because 
(1) the trial court did not correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion, instead it felt compelled 
to deny the motion by its conclusion that it had no jurisdiction; (2) the trial court failed to act 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it because the 
constitutional argument was not frivolous; and (3) the trial court did not reach its decision by an 
exercise of reason because it never considered the tolling argument. 
The denial of the motion for appointment of counsel cannot be justified by the fact that the 
court believed it did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion for a new trial. Mr. Smith's 
argument was that his motion was timely because the time to file must be tolled in order to comply 
with constitutional requirements. And as the Court of Appeals has said, "It is fair to say, of course, 
that a court has jurisdiction to determine whether it possesses jurisdiction." State v. Peterson, 148 
Idaho 610,614,226 P.3d 552,556 (Ct. App. 2010) citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,628 
(2002); and Cedano-Viera v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2003). Without the 
assistance of counsel, however, Mr. Smith was not able to develop the record needed to establish 
his constitutional claim about why the district court had jurisdiction to rule on the new trial motion. 
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Accordingly, the Court should vacate the order denying the Motion for New Trial and reverse the 
order denying the Motion for Appointment of Counsel and remand for further proceedings. See 
Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 790, 992 P.2d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Because Anderson 
was not allowed to present evidence in support of his claim that the limitation period should be 
tolled, we reverse."). 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Smith's 
Motion for Appointment of Counsel and that order should be reversed. Mr. Smith also asks this 
Court to vacate the order denying the new trial motion and remand with instructions for further 
proceedings to allow Mr. Smith to develop the facts needed to fully present his constitutional 
challenge to the I.C.R. 34 time limit as applied in this case. 
~ 
Respectfully submitted this~ of August, 2013. 
Attorney for Dana Smith 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on Auguso3 , 2013, I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing 




to: Office of the Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Dennis Benjamin 
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